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**THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON**

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August 3, 1950

Dear Admiral Millenkotter:

I want to acknowledge your letter of July 26, 1950, written in response to the Joint State Department--Defense Department proposal on national intelligence, which I forwarded to you for comment on July 7.

The Department has not had an opportunity to study the documents you submitted or to discuss your comments with the Department of Defense. It does appear, however, on the basis of a preliminary reading of your comments, that the Joint proposals submitted to you have been misconstrued.

In accordance with the responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense as members of the National Security Council, both Departments are seeking a more effective method of producing national intelligence within the framework of existing law. I am sure that both Departments feel strongly that our total government intelligence effort must be as strong as possible.

As soon as we have had the time to study your comments in detail we shall be in touch with you for further discussion.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

James E. Webb

Dear Admiral R. E. Millenkotter,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington 25, D. C.

State Department review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

The Honorable
The Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Webb:

The State-Defense Staff Study of 1 May 1950, on "Production of National Intelligence", transmitted with your letter of 7 July for my comments, points up the conflicting theories which have prevailed since the inception of CIA on the responsibility within our Government for intelligence relating to the national security, i.e., a responsible single Director versus a committee of co-equal directors of the several intelligence agencies.

The proposals set forth in the Staff Study are unacceptable to this Agency as they would, in effect, place the CIA in a position of subservience to the departmental intelligence organizations. This would be so radical a departure from the concept of the Central Intelligence Agency as envisaged by the Congress that I would not have the legal authority to adopt these proposals even if I considered them sound.

As an indication of this Congressional intent, I quote from the statement of the Chairman of the Special Subcommittee of the House Expenditures Committee Investigating Intelligence Activities of the Government (at the time of the Bogota crisis) dated 16 April 1948:

"Certainly it was not the intention of Congress, in the Act creating the CIA, to give the State Department a power of censorship over intelligence reports

It may be necessary for Congress to enact additional legislation to give the CIA the independent status it was generally presumed to enjoy Our Central Intelligence Agency must be protected against censorship or intimidation by any arm of the Executive Branch."

This position has been repeatedly made clear to me in virtually every committee session I have attended since assuming the Directorship. It is also a fact that in time of crisis

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the President and appropriate Congressional Committees have always called on the Director of Central Intelligence for an accounting and for briefing on the intelligence situation. The Congress has always made it amply clear in these situations that it holds the Director and this Agency completely responsible in the field of foreign intelligence, and it presumes that this Agency has the requisite powers and authorities to make that responsibility effective in the interests of our national security.

The effect of your Staff Study is to abrogate the statutory responsibility for the production of national intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency and shift it as a collective responsibility to a Committee. This is specified in your study as follows:

"Until the emergence of a national estimate or study from the IAC, collective responsibility is inescapable under the Act of 1947 The full statutory responsibility of the D/CI for the production of national intelligence becomes operative only when . . . final drafts of national estimates or studies are recommended by the IAC to the D/CI."

Not only does the National Security Act not contemplate any such doctrine of collective responsibility, but, in NSC 50, the National Security Council specifically disavowed this doctrine in the following language:

". . . we do not believe that the Director and the IAC should be bound by the concept of collective responsibility because this would inevitably reduce coordinated national intelligence to the lowest common denominator among the agencies concerned."

Careful thought and study has been given to the existing NSCID 1 in its relation to the statutory responsibilities of this Agency. The present directives and their implementation by departmental intelligence agencies have not been satisfactory. We have prepared for submission to the National Security Council a basic NSCID which is attached herewith for your information. This draft clearly establishes the minimum authorities necessary to enable this Agency to fulfill its statutory responsibilities and likewise establishes the responsibilities of the departmental agencies in support of national intelligence.

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It is noted that you propose to submit your Staff Study with its proposed NSC Directive direct to the NSC rather than in accordance with the provisions of Section 102d(1) and (2) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. If, as you indicate, your Staff Study is to be presented direct to the NSC it is desired that our comments and the inclosure be included in your submission. We have been instructed by the NSC to consider through normal NSCID procedure the following quoted comments of the Secretary of Defense, and to submit recommendations in connection therewith:

"I do not find the IAC comments on RECOMMENDATION 8 to be convincing. Existing directives fall far short of coming to grips with urgent and recognizable problems of coordination of intelligence in Washington and overseas. Furthermore, I do not concede that the 'rather elaborate committee structure' is either inevitable or desirable. On the contrary, it is my belief that the intricate committee structure is the consequence of compromises created by inter-bureau rivalries rather than the results of objective study of intelligence organization.

Dependable conclusions from * * * intelligence, as from every other subject matter of national intelligence, should result from evaluation and synthesis within the framework of the Central Agency of all available material from every Federal source. Final responsibility for coordinating the collection of this material as well as its processing should rest squarely in the same agency. With that responsibility should go corresponding authority, which now is ambiguous and obscured in the present interlocking committee structure."

For your information, it is also intended that the inclosure to this paper be used in connection with the NSC directive referred to above.

Sincerely,

R. H. HILLENKOTTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

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